Ohio Northern University

DigitalCommons@ONU
Law Faculty Scholarship

Pettit College of Law

2021

Hitting the Trip Wire: When does a Company Become a "Marijuana
Business"?
Lauren A. Newell
Ohio Northern University, l-newell@onu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.onu.edu/law_faculty
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, and the Food and Drug Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Lauren Newell, Hitting the Trip Wire: When does a Company Become a "Marijuana Business"?, 101 Bos. U.
L. Rev. 1105 (2021).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Pettit College of Law at DigitalCommons@ONU. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Law Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@ONU. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@onu.edu.

HITTING THE TRIP WIRE:
WHEN DOES A COMPANY BECOME A “MARIJUANA
BUSINESS”?
LAUREN A. NEWELL*

ABSTRACT
Like the alcohol industry was during Prohibition, the marijuana industry is a
profitable one. And, as bootlegging was then, selling marijuana in the United
States is currently illegal. Despite the number of states that have legalized or
decriminalized the sale of marijuana for medical or recreational use under state
law, marijuana sales remain illegal as a matter of federal law under the federal
Controlled Substances Act of 1970 (“CSA”). Individuals and entities that violate
the CSA face substantial criminal and civil liability, including prison time and
fines, alongside a host of additional negative consequences arising from
business, tax, bankruptcy, and banking law, as well as other sources. The
negative consequences that marijuana businesses face have been discussed in
detail elsewhere. This Essay asks a different question: not what are the negative
consequences, but rather, when do those negative consequences attach? In other
words, when does a company become a “Marijuana Business”?
For purposes of this discussion, a Marijuana Business is an entity that
participates, contributes, or assists, directly or indirectly, in the retail and/or
medical marijuana industry to an extent that exposes it, its owners, and its
agents to potential criminal and civil liability and other negative business
consequences. In short, these are the companies that should be worried about
the fact that they are engaging in an industry that is illegal under federal law.
To identify the circumstances that result in a company’s being a Marijuana
Business, this Essay analyzes seven hypothetical companies that directly
participate in the marijuana industry or support others that do. For each, the
Essay asks whether the facts are sufficient to establish criminal liability either
directly under the CSA or indirectly under criminal conspiracy or aiding and
abetting liability theories.

*
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There’s no such thing as good money or bad money. There’s just money.
—Charles “Lucky” Luciano
INTRODUCTION: MARIJUANA BUSINESSES
Like the alcohol industry was during Prohibition, the marijuana industry is a
profitable one.1 And, as bootlegging was then, selling marijuana in the United
States is currently illegal. Despite the number of states that have legalized or
decriminalized the sale of marijuana for medical or recreational use under state
law,2 marijuana sales remain illegal as a matter of federal law under the federal
Controlled Substances Act of 1970 (“CSA”).3 Individuals and entities that
violate the CSA face substantial criminal and civil liability, including prison
time and fines, alongside a host of additional negative consequences arising from
business, tax, bankruptcy, and banking law, as well as other sources. The
negative consequences that marijuana businesses face have been discussed in
detail elsewhere.4 This Essay asks a different question: not what are the negative
consequences, but rather, when do those negative consequences attach? In other
words, when does a company become a “Marijuana Business”?
For purposes of this discussion, a Marijuana Business is an entity that
participates, contributes, or assists, directly or indirectly, in the retail and/or
medical marijuana industry to an extent that exposes it, its owners, and its agents
to potential criminal and civil liability and other negative business
1
See A Bootlegger’s Story, NEW YORKER (Sept. 25, 1926), https://www.newyorker.com
/magazine/1926/09/25/a-bootleggers-story-i-how-i-started (describing the profitability of the
illegal liquor business during Prohibition and concomitant encounters with law enforcement);
Eli McVey, Chart: US Cannabis Industry’s Economic Impact Could Hit $130 Billion by 2024,
MARIJUANA BUS. DAILY (July 21, 2020), https://mjbizdaily.com/chart-us-cannabis-industryseconomic-impact-could-hit-130-billion-by-2024/ [https://perma.cc/ZX44-3T6R].
2
See State Medical Marijuana Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, https://
www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx [hhttps://perma.cc/GAZ4XGYJ] (last updated May 17, 2021) (listing seventeen states and three U.S. territories that
have legalized both recreational and medical marijuana sales and thirty-six states and four
U.S. territories that have approved medical marijuana sales).
3
See generally 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904.
4
E.g., Casey W. Baker, Marijuana’s Continuing Illegality and Investors’ Securities Fraud
Problem: The Doctrines of Unclean Hands and In Pari Delicto, 12 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP
& L. 93 (2019); Julie Andersen Hill, Banks, Marijuana, and Federalism, 65 CASE WESTERN
RESERVE L. REV. 597 (2015); Sam Kamin & Viva R. Moffat, Trademark Laundering, Useless
Patents, and Other IP Challenges for the Marijuana Industry, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 217
(2016); Sam Kamin & Eli Wald, Marijuana Lawyers: Outlaws or Crusaders?, 91 OR. L. REV.
869 (2013); Benjamin Moses Leff, Tax Planning for Marijuana Dealers, 99 IOWA L. REV.
523 (2014); Robert A. Mikos, State Taxation of Marijuana Distribution and Other Federal
Crimes, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 223; Lauren A. Newell, High Crimes: Liability for Directors
of Retail Marijuana Corporations, 16 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 419 (2020) [hereinafter Newell,
High Crimes]; Lauren A. Newell, Up in Smoke? Unintended Consequences of Retail
Marijuana Laws for Partnerships, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1343 (2017) [hereinafter Newell, Up
in Smoke]; Luke Scheuer, The “Legal” Marijuana Industry’s Challenge for Business Entity
Law, 6 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 511 (2015).
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consequences. In short, these are the companies that should be worried about the
fact that they are engaging in an industry that is illegal under federal law. To
identify the circumstances that result in a company’s constituting a Marijuana
Business, this Essay analyzes seven hypothetical companies that directly
participate in the marijuana industry or support others that do. For each, the
Essay asks whether the facts are sufficient to establish criminal liability either
directly under the CSA or indirectly under criminal conspiracy or aiding and
abetting liability theories.5 Part I briefly introduces criminal liability under the
CSA, along with the two complicity theories. Part II analyzes the hypothetical
companies’ actions and determines whether they are Marijuana Businesses. Part
III concludes with factors that courts and companies can look toward to
determine whether those companies are indeed Marijuana Businesses.
I.
A.

CRIMINAL LIABILITY

Controlled Substances Act

Section 841(a)(1) of the CSA provides that it is “unlawful for any person
knowingly or intentionally . . . to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or
possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled
substance,” except as authorized by other provisions of the CSA.6 The CSA
designates “[m]arihuana” as a “Schedule I” controlled substance, meaning that
it “has a high potential for abuse,” it “has no currently accepted medical use in
treatment,” and “[t]here is a lack of accepted safety” for its use under medical
supervision.7 Schedule I is the most restrictive controlled substance designation
in the CSA.8 The only purpose authorized under the CSA for Schedule I
substances is use in federal authorized research.9 This means that the
manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of “marihuana,” or the possession with
intent to do one of those things, is a felony.10 As used in this Essay, both
“cannabis” and “marijuana” fall within the statutory definition of
“marihuana”—i.e., both are Schedule I controlled substances.11
5

There are other theories of criminal and civil liability that could trigger negative business
consequences and cause a company to become a Marijuana Business, such as liability under
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968.
See Newell, High Crimes, supra note 4, at 463-66, for a discussion of potential RICO liability
for companies engaged in the marijuana industry. For the sake of brevity, this Essay is limited
to a discussion of criminal liability stemming from CSA violations.
6
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
7
Id. § 812(b)(1), 812(c) Schedule I (c)(10).
8
See id. § 812(b)(1).
9
Id. § 823(f).
10
Id. § 841(b)(1)(B), (D).
11
The CSA defines “marihuana” as “all parts of the plant Cannabis sativa L., whether
growing or not; the seeds thereof; the resin extracted from any part of such plant; and every
compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such plant, its seeds or
resin.” Id. § 802(16)(A). The term does not include hemp. Id. § 802(16)(B). This Essay uses
the term “cannabis” to refer to the Cannabis sativa plant and “marijuana” to refer to the parts
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Conspiracy Liability

Section 846 of the CSA provides that “[a]ny person who attempts or conspires
to commit any offense defined in [the CSA] shall be subject to the same penalties
as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of
the attempt or conspiracy.”12 As the Supreme Court has observed, “Conspiracy
is an inchoate offense, the essence of which is an agreement to commit an
unlawful act.”13 No proof of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy is
required to establish a violation of § 846.14 The act of agreement to violate the
law constitutes the actus reus.15
The Courts of Appeals have adopted different tests for conviction of
conspiracy under § 846, the relevant specifics of which are discussed below.16
Generally speaking, a conviction of conspiracy to violate the CSA requires proof
that a conspiracy existed and that the defendant knew about the scheme to violate
the CSA and agreed to be a part of the scheme.17 The mens rea element is
satisfied when the defendant’s participation in the conspiracy is both knowing
and voluntary.18 A conspiracy to commit a crime and the crime’s subsequent
commission generally do not merge into a single offense; the conspiracy and the
subsequent crime can be punished separately.19
C.

Aiding and Abetting Liability

Title 18, § 2(a), of the United States Code establishes criminal liability for
aiding and abetting a crime. Under this section, “[w]hoever commits an offense
against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or
procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.”20 A person incurs aiding
and abetting liability for “a crime if (and only if) he (1) takes an affirmative act
in furtherance of that offense, (2) with the intent of facilitating the offense’s
commission.”21 The parameters of this offense are somewhat murky.22 It is not

of or products from the plant that contain a substantial amount of tetrahydrocannabinol, the
psychoactive component of marijuana. See Cannabis (Marijuana) and Cannabinoids: What
You Need to Know, NAT’L CTR. FOR COMPLEMENTARY & INTEGRATIVE HEALTH,
https://www.nccih.nih.gov/health/cannabis-marijuana-and-cannabinoids-what-you-need-toknow [https://perma.cc/5A6B-MYUR] (last updated Nov. 2019).
12
21 U.S.C. § 846.
13
Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 (1975).
14
United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 16 (1994).
15
Id. at 15-16.
16
See infra Sections II.D-G.
17
See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 58 F.3d 154, 159 (5th Cir. 1995).
18
See id.
19
See Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777-78 (1975); Pinkerton v. United States,
328 U.S. 640, 644 (1946).
20
18 U.S.C. § 2(a).
21
Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65, 71 (2014).
22
See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164,
188 (1994) (“[T]he rules for determining aiding and abetting liability are unclear . . . .”).
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necessary to establish that an aider and abettor participated in every element of
the crime to satisfy the actus reus component, and there can be a conviction even
if the aid pertains only to one of the crime’s elements.23 The statutory language
“‘aid and abet’ comprehends ‘all assistance rendered by words, acts,
encouragement, support, or presence.’”24 The amount of aid can be “minimal”;
“‘[t]he quantity [of assistance] [is] immaterial,’ so long as the accomplice did
‘something’ to aid the crime.”25 Thus, aiding and abetting is somewhat broader
than conspiracy: “It makes a defendant a principal when he consciously shares
in any criminal act whether or not there is a conspiracy.”26
The mens rea necessary to satisfy the intent element is not entirely clear.27
“There is some tension” in the Supreme Court’s cases on this point, with some
cases suggesting a requirement of acting “purposefully or with intent” and others
requiring mere knowledge—though this is perhaps a distinction without much
of a difference.28 In its recent aiding and abetting case, Rosemond v. United
States,29 the Court found the “intent requirement satisfied when a person actively
participates in a criminal venture with full knowledge of the circumstances
constituting the charged offense.”30 The knowledge must be “advance
knowledge,” meaning that it must permit the defendant the opportunity to choose
to aid the crime or to walk away.31 The government must prove “a state of mind
extending to the entire crime,” and the defendant’s “intent must go to the specific
and entire crime charged.”32 Unhelpfully, the Rosemond Court reserved the
question of how to treat “defendants who incidentally facilitate a criminal
venture rather than actively participate in it” (e.g., a gun store owner who sells

23

Rosemond, 572 U.S. at 73.
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 178 (1993) (quoting Aid and Abet, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 68 (6th ed. 1990)).
25
Rosemond, 572 U.S. at 73 (second alteration in original) (quoting ROBERT DESTY, A
COMPENDIUM OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW § 37a, at 106 (1882)).
26
Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 620 (1949).
27
See Rosemond, 572 U.S. at 71.
28
Id. at 84-85 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The Court refers
interchangeably to both of these tests and thus leaves our case law in the same, somewhat
conflicted state that previously existed. But because the difference between acting
purposefully (when that concept is properly understood) and acting knowingly is slight, this
is not a matter of great concern.”); see also Pereira v. United States., 347 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1954)
(suggesting that a jury could convict a defendant of aiding and abetting when the defendant
“shared [the principal’s] knowledge and agreed with him” about the means of carrying out
the crime); Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160, 164-65 (1947) (implying a knowledge
standard). But see Nye & Nissen, 336 U.S. at 619 (“In order to aid and abet another to commit
a crime it is necessary that a defendant ‘in some sort associate himself with the venture, that
he participate in it as in something that he wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action to
make it succeed.’” (quoting United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938))).
29
572 U.S. 65 (2014).
30
Id. at 77.
31
Id. at 78.
32
Id. at 76.
24
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a gun to a criminal, “knowing but not caring how the gun will be used”).33 This
uncertainty leaves open the possibility that companies that support or assist
Marijuana Businesses may themselves become Marijuana Businesses.
II.

HYPOTHETICALS

With the foregoing legal backdrop in mind, this Part analyzes seven
hypothetical companies that could potentially be classified as Marijuana
Businesses, beginning with the most likely to be Marijuana Businesses and
ending with the least likely. It sets forth the applicable law in each jurisdiction
and applies that law to the factual circumstances presented to conclude whether
each company is a Marijuana Business.
A.

Brad’s Buds LLC
Brad’s Buds LLC (“Brad’s Buds”) obtains a Marijuana Producer Tier 3
license from the Washington State Liquor and Cannabis Board.34 Brad’s
Buds cultivates and packages cannabis and sells it to licensed marijuana
processors.

This first scenario is an easy one. Brad’s Buds’s license permits (under
Washington law) it to “produce, harvest, trim, dry, cure, and package marijuana
into lots for sale at wholesale to cannabis licensees.”35 This is precisely the
conduct in which Brad’s Buds is engaging. Section 841(a)(1) of the CSA makes
it “unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally . . . to manufacture,
distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or
dispense, a controlled substance.”36 Under the CSA, “[t]he term ‘manufacture’
means the production, preparation, propagation, compounding, or processing of
a drug or other substance, either directly or indirectly or by extraction from
substances of natural origin . . . and includes any packaging or repackaging of
such substance . . . .”37 “[P]roduction” means “the manufacture, planting,
cultivation, growing, or harvesting of a controlled substance.”38 By definition,
cultivating cannabis plants constitutes production, and this production and
packaging of the plants in turn constitute manufacture, so Brad’s Buds is
manufacturing cannabis. Further, under the CSA, “distribute” means to “deliver
(other than by administering or dispensing) a controlled substance.”39 By selling
cannabis to licensed processors, Brad’s Buds is clearly distributing a controlled
substance. The fact that Brad’s Buds obtained a license in Washington to
33

Id. at 77 n.8.
See Producer License Descriptions and Fees, WASH. STATE LIQUOR & CANNABIS BD.,
https://lcb.wa.gov/mjlicense/producer_license_discriptions_fees
[https://perma.cc/6TZCGL4H] (last visited Apr. 13, 2021).
35
Id.
36
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
37
Id. § 802(15).
38
Id. § 802(22).
39
Id. § 802(11).
34
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produce cannabis and sell it to processors leaves no question that Brad’s Buds
is knowingly or intentionally manufacturing and distributing cannabis. Thus,
Brad’s Buds is violating an express provision of the CSA in two respects,
making Brad’s Buds a Marijuana Business.
B.

Entire Foods Market Inc.
Entire Foods Market Inc. (“Entire Foods”) is a national grocery chain
focused on organic and locally sourced foods with over $15 billion in
annual revenue. Entire Foods starts selling marijuana brownies in its
California stores. Entire Foods derives $50,000 of its annual revenue from
sales of these brownies.

Here, Entire Foods is selling—i.e., distributing40—marijuana, this time to
grocery store customers in the form of brownies. It is not plausible that Entire
Foods’s sales are anything other than knowing and intentional. Thus, again,
Entire Foods is violating § 841(a)(1) of the CSA and is a Marijuana Business.
It is somewhat tempting to compare the $50,000 in annual revenue Entire
Foods derives from the marijuana brownies, which are sold only in its California
stores, with the $15 billion in annual revenue Entire Foods garners from its
nationwide operations. This may lead to the conclusion that Entire Foods is not
truly in the “business” of selling marijuana because the vast majority of its
revenue comes from other, presumably legal, sources. Although this is a
tempting argument, it is unlikely to be a successful one. Section 841(a)(1) of the
CSA does not ask whether someone is “in the business” of, or has a “primary
business” of, distributing a controlled substance. Nor does it excuse distribution
that amounts to a small percentage of a business’s total revenues.
On the contrary, § 841 provides substantial penalties for infractions involving
even small amounts of marijuana. Under § 841(b)(1)(D), a violation of § 841(a)
involving less than fifty kilograms of marijuana results in a prison sentence of
up to five years, a fine of up to $1 million for an entity defendant, or both.41 A
person who distributes “a small amount of marihuana for no remuneration” faces
reduced penalties for simple possession.42 This subsection is inapplicable,
however, given that Entire Foods is selling brownies, not giving them away for
free. Moreover, even if Entire Foods fell under this subsection, it would still be
violating the CSA; it would simply face smaller penalties for doing so. Thus,
because Entire Foods’s brownie sales violate the CSA’s prohibition on
distributing a controlled substance, Entire Foods is a Marijuana Business.
C.

Wonderful Warehouses Corp.
Wonderful Warehouses Corp. (“Wonderful”) is an Illinois corporation
that owns and leases warehouse space to a variety of tenants. Wonderful

40
41
42

See id.
Id. § 841(b)(1)(D).
Id. §§ 841(b)(4), 844(a).
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derives 25% of its revenues from leasing warehouse space to tenants
engaged in the business of growing cannabis, with full knowledge of the
tenants’ businesses.
In this scenario, Wonderful rents warehouse space to cannabis cultivators,
knowing that its premises are being used for the purpose of growing cannabis.
The fact that Wonderful does not itself cultivate cannabis, combined with the
fact that the vast majority of Wonderful’s rental business does not involve
cannabis, initially makes it seem as though Wonderful is safe from being deemed
a Marijuana Business. Unfortunately for Wonderful, this is not the case.
Under CSA § 856(a)(2), it is unlawful to “manage or control any place,
whether permanently or temporarily, . . . as an owner, . . . and knowingly and
intentionally rent, lease, profit from, or make available for use, with or without
compensation, the place for the purpose of unlawfully manufacturing, storing,
distributing, or using a controlled substance.”43 Again, “manufacture” includes
“production . . . of a drug or other substance,”44 and “production” includes the
“planting, cultivation, growing, or harvesting of a controlled substance.”45
Wonderful manages a place as an owner (its warehouses) and knowingly and
intentionally leases the space to cannabis growers so they can unlawfully
manufacture (grow) a controlled substance (cannabis). Wonderful is thereby
violating § 856(a)(2), which makes Wonderful a Marijuana Business.
D.

Galaxy Brands, Inc.
Galaxy Brands, Inc. (“Galaxy”), a Fortune 500 company,46 obtains an 8%
equity interest in Mary Jane’s Syrups, LLC (“Mary Jane’s”), a Vermontbased company that makes and sells marijuana-infused maple syrup in its
Vermont stores. Galaxy is a passive investor and does not have the right to
appoint any members of Mary Jane’s management.

At first glance, a Fortune 500 company’s minority, passive investment in a
small private company seems unlikely to be problematic. Galaxy does not make

43

Id. § 856(a)(2).
Id. § 802(15).
45
Id. § 802(22).
46
The Fortune 500 list is a list of the 500 largest U.S. companies. Fortune 500, FORTUNE,
https://fortune.com/fortune500/ [https://perma.cc/5A2X-L7VG] (last visited Apr. 13, 2021).
This example purposefully evokes comparisons to Fortune 500 alcoholic beverage maker
Constellation Brands, Inc.’s recent investment of over $4 billion in Canopy Growth
Corporation, a Canadian company that sells medical and retail marijuana. See Press Release,
Constellation Brands & Canopy Growth Corp., Constellation Brands to Invest $5 Billion
CAD ($4 Billion USD) in Canopy Growth to Establish Transformative Global Position and
Alignment
(Aug.
15,
2018),
https://www.canopygrowth.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/08/CBI-CG-Press-Release-FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NF7VQ2X3].
44
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or distribute marijuana products, and it does not control47 Mary Jane’s, the
company that does make and distribute those products. Determining whether
Galaxy faces CSA liability requires a detour to review a recent bankruptcy case,
In re Malul,48 in which the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado
examined equity investment in Marijuana Businesses.49
The debtor in Malul invested $50,000 in Heartland Caregivers, LLC, a
business that cultivated and sold medical marijuana to Colorado dispensaries.50
The subscription agreement that the debtor executed entitled her to receive a
percentage of Heartland’s net revenues from operations until she recouped her
initial investment, plus a percentage of all of Heartland’s net revenues going
forward.51 The debtor’s investment was passive, affording her no voting rights
or managerial powers.52 In vacating the debtor’s motion to reopen her
bankruptcy case to disclose her interests in Heartland as possible assets, the court
found that the debtor’s ownership interests in Heartland constituted a continuing
violation of the CSA.53 The court pointed to § 854(a), which makes it
unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or
indirectly, from a violation of [the CSA] . . . in which such person has
participated as a principal . . . to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any
part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any
interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is
engaged in, or the activities of which affect interstate or foreign
commerce.54
Under § 854(c), “enterprise” includes “any individual, partnership,
corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.”55 The court also noted
§ 854(d), which provides that § 854 “shall be liberally construed to effectuate its
remedial purposes.”56
Applying these provisions, the court found that

47
For one possible definition of “control,” see the Securities and Exchange Commission’s
formulation in 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2020): “The term control (including the terms
controlling, controlled by and under common control with) means the possession, direct or
indirect, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of a
person, whether through the ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise.” It is
highly doubtful that Galaxy would be found to “control” Mary Jane’s under this or any other
variant of the definition.
48
614 B.R. 699 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2020).
49
Id. at 701-02.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 702.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 713-14.
54
21 U.S.C. § 854(a).
55
Id. § 854(c).
56
In re Malul, 614 B.R. at 711 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 854(d)).
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it was illegal for [Heartland’s founder] to incorporate Heartland, to solicit
investments in Heartland, and to sell securities in Heartland.
Concomitantly, it was illegal for [the debtor] to execute the Subscription
Agreement and to own an interest in Heartland, and it would have been
illegal for [the debtor] to accept distributions from Heartland on account of
those interests.57
The court did not point to any act by the debtor to cultivate or distribute
marijuana in violation of § 841, “but rather, the illegality arose immediately
upon the creation of [the debtor’s] equity interest by virtue of CSA § 854.”58
Further, the court stated that the debtor’s criminal violations, by virtue of having
executed the subscription agreement, could be pursued under a direct liability
theory under § 854, a conspiracy theory under § 846, or an aiding and abetting
theory under 18 U.S.C. § 2.59
This is an extremely expansive reading of § 854, even given § 854(d)’s
command to construe the section liberally. On its face, § 854 proscribes the use
of marijuana-related funds to invest in, establish, or operate an enterprise that
engages in or affects interstate commerce. In other words, it targets money
laundering. It does not expressly prohibit investment of “clean,” non-marijuanarelated funds in a company established to engage in the marijuana industry. Nor
does it expressly prohibit acceptance of proceeds from a company engaged in
the marijuana industry if those proceeds are not then used to invest in, establish,
or operate a business engaged in or affecting interstate commerce. Perhaps this
oversight stems from the fact that it seemed too obviously unnecessary to the
statute’s drafters to bar investment in a company engaged in the marijuana
industry, since that very engagement is prohibited under § 841.60 Be that as it
may, the court’s reading of § 854 is both novel and quite broad, insofar as the
court reads into the text of the statute a blanket prohibition on investment in
companies engaged in the marijuana industry.
Malul appears to be the first case in which a court has applied § 854 to nondrug-related money invested in a drug-related business. It remains to be seen
whether other courts will take a similarly expansive view of § 854 or whether
they will hew more closely to its text.61 If a court applies the Malul approach,
57

Id. As a note, the court’s use of “incorporate” here is inaccurate, given that Heartland
was a limited liability company—i.e., an unincorporated entity.
58
Id. at 712.
59
Id. at 711 n.84.
60
See Newell, High Crimes, supra note 4, at 435-41 (describing the illegal purpose
doctrine as applied to companies engaged in the marijuana industry); Newell, Up in Smoke,
supra note 4, at 1361-62, 1364-69 (same).
61
In particular, the fact that this interpretation comes from a bankruptcy court potentially
makes it less likely that other courts will follow suit. “[C]ourts of bankruptcy are essentially
courts of equity, and their proceedings inherently proceedings in equity.” Loc. Loan Co. v.
Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 240 (1934). But see Marcia S. Krieger, “The Bankruptcy Court Is a Court
of Equity”: What Does That Mean?, 50 S.C. L. REV. 275, 299, 306 (1999) (contending that
Local Loan misconstrues and misquotes a case it relies upon for the proposition that
bankruptcy courts are courts in equity). The equity label, though of questionable accuracy, is
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Galaxy appears to be in trouble: Galaxy has purchased an interest in a company
with activities that almost certainly affect interstate or foreign commerce, given
the Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of this commerce standard.62
According to Malul, the acts of executing an investment agreement with Mary
Jane’s, owning the equity interest in Mary Jane’s, and accepting any
distributions from Mary Jane’s on account of that interest would all constitute
violations of § 854. Under this approach, it does not matter that Galaxy is a
passive investor with a very small minority interest. The investment was illegal
ab initio, and it makes Galaxy a Marijuana Business.
If a court applies § 854 more strictly, Galaxy’s situation is more equivocal.
On its face, the section does not bar Galaxy from investing non-marijuanarelated funds into Mary Jane’s. The mere fact of its equity ownership would not
make Galaxy a Marijuana Business. Galaxy would, however, violate § 854 if it
received any income from Mary Jane’s and then used that income (or its
proceeds) to invest in or start another business affecting interstate commerce.
Likewise, since Galaxy, as a Fortune 500 company, is almost certainly engaged
in interstate commerce, it would violate § 854 if it used any part of its proceeds
from Mary Jane’s to finance its own operations. Thus, Galaxy technically could
invest in Mary Jane’s without running afoul of § 854, but it would be extremely
difficult to reap any financial benefits of that investment without doing so.
Regardless of whether § 854 is construed broadly or narrowly such that
Galaxy is found to have violated it, Galaxy also risks being ensnared by a
conspiracy theory of liability under § 846 or an aiding and abetting theory of
liability under 18 U.S.C. § 2. To convict someone of conspiracy under § 846,
the Second Circuit requires proof that the defendant (1) knew of the existence of
the alleged scheme, (2) “knowingly joined and participated in it,” and (3) had
the specific intent to violate the underlying statute.63 A conspirator need not
know all of the conspiracy’s details, but “the defendant must at least have had
knowledge that a common endeavor existed”64 and must have “intended to

used by bankruptcy courts “to justify discretionary decisions . . . , legitimize a particular
determination,” or “justify a deviation from accepted procedure or an order crafted for a
particular situation.” See Krieger, supra, at 298-306 (footnote omitted). This suggests that a
court of general jurisdiction might apply the statutory text more strictly.
62
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995) (noting the “wide variety of
congressional Acts regulating intrastate economic activity” that the Court found to have
“substantially affected interstate commerce,” including “intrastate coal mining,” “intrastate
extortionate credit transactions,” “restaurants utilizing substantial interstate supplies,” “inns
and hotels catering to interstate guests,” and “consumption of homegrown wheat”). Given the
breadth of examples in which the Supreme Court has found an activity to substantially affect
interstate commerce, it hardly seems a stretch to think that a company selling a retail
marijuana product in stores available to interstate customers would be found to substantially
affect both interstate and foreign commerce, especially since Vermont shares a border with
Canada, which has fully legalized retail marijuana. See Cannabis Act, S.C. 2018, c 16 (Can.).
63
United States v. Gaviria, 740 F.2d 174, 183 (2d Cir. 1984).
64
United States v. Nusraty, 867 F.2d 759, 763 (2d Cir. 1989).
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participate in it or to make it succeed.”65 The Second Circuit permits proof of
knowledge by establishing conscious avoidance—i.e., a conclusion that the
defendant purposefully avoided gaining actual knowledge of a fact—when the
facts permit such a conclusion to be reached.66 Circumstantial evidence is
sufficient to prove conspiracy.67
Applying this test, first, Galaxy presumably knows that Mary Jane’s sells
marijuana-infused maple syrup (a violation of § 841(a)(1)’s prohibition on
distribution of a controlled substance68), though proof of this knowledge,
whether direct or circumstantial, is necessary. Investment documentation that
makes reference to Mary Jane’s line of business would be a convenient way to
establish knowledge, but only if that documentation specifies that Mary Jane’s
sells syrup laced with marijuana. Otherwise, the prosecution may need to rely
on a conscious avoidance instruction, asking the jury to conclude based on the
circumstances that a company of Galaxy’s size would not be interested in Mary
Jane’s unless it either actually knew or avoided knowing that Mary Jane’s was
selling marijuana syrups.
Second, Galaxy has intentionally invested in Mary Jane’s. This demonstrates
that Galaxy has participated in Mary Jane’s violation of the CSA by providing
funding for Mary Jane’s operations. If the prosecution can establish Galaxy’s
knowledge of Mary Jane’s marijuana-syrup sales, then Galaxy appears to have
knowingly joined and participated in those sales by purchasing an equity stake.
On the other hand, if the facts suggest that Galaxy invested in Mary Jane’s
without knowing that Mary Jane’s infused its syrup with marijuana, this element
would fail as well; its investment would still be intentional, but it would not have
intended to participate in a scheme to distribute marijuana.
Finally, assuming Galaxy’s knowledge of the marijuana sales, it is likely
possible to prove that Galaxy has the specific intent to violate both § 841(a)(1)
and § 854. Galaxy’s purchase of an ownership interest in Mary Jane’s provides
Mary Jane’s with capital to further its syrup sales, in violation of § 841(a)(1).
Also, Galaxy’s equity interest is in an entity that uses marijuana-related income
in its operations in violation of § 854. There is no indication that Mary Jane’s
syrup sales are clandestine or that Galaxy has earmarked its investment funds
for some other, legitimate business purpose. Thus, because Galaxy is

65

United States v. Cirillo, 499 F.2d 872, 883 (2d Cir. 1974); see also United States v.
Cianchetti, 315 F.2d 584, 588 (2d Cir. 1963) (requiring an “affirmative attempt” to further the
purposes of the conspiracy); United States v. Falcone, 109 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1940)
(conspirator must “promote [the] venture himself . . . [and] have a stake in its outcome”).
66
See United States v. Aina-Marshall, 336 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[A] conscious
avoidance instruction may be given only (i) when a defendant asserts the lack of some specific
aspect of knowledge required for conviction, and (ii) the appropriate factual predicate for the
charge exists, i.e., the evidence is such that a rational juror may reach the conclusion ‘beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant was aware of a high probability of the fact in dispute
and consciously avoided confirming that fact.’” (citation omitted) (quoting United States v.
Rodriguez, 983 F.2d 455, 458 (2d Cir. 1993))).
67
United States v. Wardy, 777 F.2d 101, 107 (2d Cir. 1985).
68
See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
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intentionally financing the operations of a company that is selling a marijuana
product, Galaxy can likely be convicted on a conspiracy liability theory under
§§ 841(a)(1), 846, and 854, making Galaxy a Marijuana Business.
Alternatively, Galaxy could be liable on an aiding and abetting theory under
18 U.S.C. § 2. Criminal liability will attach under § 2 when the aider and abettor
“(1) takes an affirmative act in furtherance of [the] offense, (2) with the intent
of facilitating the offense’s commission.”69 In the Second Circuit, the
defendant’s act must have “actually contributed to the success of the specific
crime that the defendant is charged with aiding and abetting.”70 “[T]he quantum
of assistance provided by an accomplice may be trifling, [but] it cannot be
zero.”71 Defendants have the requisite intent when they “actively participate[] in
a criminal venture with full knowledge of the circumstances constituting the
charged offense,” “‘participate in it as in something that [they wish] to bring
about’ and ‘seek by [their] action to make it succeed.’”72 Knowledge can be
established by proof of either actual knowledge or conscious avoidance of the
relevant knowledge.73 Both knowledge and intent may be established through
circumstantial evidence.74
Given the “low hurdle” of the aiding and abetting affirmative act
requirement,75 Galaxy’s provision of funding to Mary Jane’s likely supplies the
necessary actus reus. Galaxy has not simply provided information to Mary
Jane’s that is useful for participation in the marijuana industry,76 sold Mary
Jane’s equipment that happened to be used to make the syrup,77 or merely

69

Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65, 71 (2014).
United States v. Delgado, 972 F.3d 63, 67 (2d Cir. 2020), cert. denied sub nom.
Anastasio v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1114 (2021). For instance, the Second Circuit has
concluded that the facts did not support accomplice liability where the defendant agreed to
try to obtain and deliver cocaine to an accomplice for resale but the accomplice obtained and
later sold cocaine obtained from a different source. See United States v. Labat, 905 F.2d 18,
20-23 (2d Cir. 1990). The court reversed the defendant’s conviction because there was
insufficient evidence to support the charge of possession with intent to distribute the specific
batch of cocaine sold. Id. at 23.
71
Delgado, 972 F.3d at 75.
72
Rosemond, 572 U.S. at 76-77 (quoting Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613,
619 (1949)).
73
See United States v. Reyes, 795 F. App’x 10, 13 (2d Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct.
2551 (2020).
74
See United States v. Cruz, 363 F.3d 187, 199 (2d Cir. 2004).
75
Delgado, 972 F.3d at 74; see also supra text accompanying notes 23-25.
76
See Mann v. Gullickson, No. 15-cv-03630, 2016 WL 6473215, at *1, *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov.
2, 2016) (rejecting a complicity liability theory where the defendant provided hydroponic and
licensing consulting services to people trying to enter the marijuana industry).
77
See In re Way to Grow, Inc., 597 B.R. 111, 126 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2018) (declining to
find liability under 18 U.S.C. § 2 where the debtor sold hydroponic farming equipment that
was used by customers including, but not limited to, marijuana growers).
70
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recommended that Mary Jane’s sell marijuana-laced syrup.78 Instead, Galaxy
has purchased an ownership interest in Mary Jane’s and is, therefore, directly or
indirectly funding Mary Jane’s marijuana-syrup sales operations. If there were
facts suggesting that Mary Jane’s had a wide variety of operations—e.g., if Mary
Jane’s sold an assortment of non-marijuana-infused jams, cheeses, and honeys—
then there could be some question of whether Galaxy is contributing to the
success of this specific crime in making its equity investment. The question
would grow thornier if Mary Jane’s earmarked the capital raised from Galaxy’s
investment for building a new dairy barn, for example. But, assuming that Mary
Jane’s solely (or even primarily) makes marijuana-infused maple syrup, then a
court would likely find that providing general funding to Mary Jane’s
contributes to its success in selling marijuana-infused syrup sufficiently for
aiding and abetting liability.
Whether Galaxy has the requisite mens rea is less clear on these bare facts,
but it is easy to imagine the case that a prosecutor might build. By purchasing
an equity stake in Mary Jane’s, Galaxy is actively participating in Mary Jane’s
criminal business venture, likely with full knowledge (or at least conscious
avoidance) of exactly what Mary Jane’s is selling, as discussed earlier with
respect to conspiracy. The question is then whether Galaxy is seeking, by
providing this funding, to make Mary Jane’s sales succeed. The answer
presumably is yes. Why would Galaxy invest in a syrup business it hoped would
fail? Absent facts demonstrating a different reason for Galaxy’s investment in
Mary Jane’s, the most plausible reason for its equity purchase is that Galaxy
wants to aid Mary Jane’s syrup sales and share in the resulting profits. Thus, it
is likely that a court would find that Galaxy had the requisite intent and took the
necessary affirmative act by investing to expose it to accomplice liability. So,
whether under a direct or indirect theory of liability, Galaxy is likely to be a
Marijuana Business.
E.

Larry’s Landscaping Corp.
Larry’s Landscaping Corp. (“Larry’s”) offers a variety of landscaping
services, including planting services, to its customers in Maine. Larry’s
was hired to plant cannabis plants for some local cannabis cultivators on
the cultivators’ property. The cultivators supplied the plants. Larry’s
provided the tools, landscaping equipment, and personnel, and it planted
the plants.

This next scenario similarly provides several avenues by which a company
that is not squarely in the marijuana industry could be deemed a Marijuana
Business. The first is again under CSA § 841(a), banning the knowing or
intentional “manufacture” of “or possess[ion] with intent to manufacture”

78
See Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 639 (9th Cir. 2002) (implicitly rejecting argument
that a doctor’s recommendation that a patient use medical marijuana encourages illegal
marijuana use).
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marijuana.79 As discussed before, under § 802(15), the term “manufacture”
includes the “production” of a controlled substance,80 and under § 802(22),
“production” means “the manufacture, planting, cultivation, growing, or
harvesting of a controlled substance.”81 If planting constitutes production and
production constitutes manufacture, then Larry’s planting cannabis plants
constitutes manufacturing a controlled substance. The only real question is
whether Larry’s planted knowingly or intentionally.
Though we would certainly need more facts to prove the crime, the planting,
and therefore the manufacture, was likely both knowing and intentional. Larry’s
was hired by cannabis cultivators to plant cannabis plants. Imagine that the
cannabis cultivators called Larry’s and said, “We are cannabis cultivators. We’d
like to hire you to plant cannabis plants for us.” Larry’s then agreed, and Larry’s
employees then did plant the plants. Larry’s pretty clearly has the positive intent
to plant cannabis plants. Because of the CSA definitions of “production” and
“manufacture,” Larry’s intent to plant cannabis is necessarily intent to
manufacture cannabis.
The situation is somewhat trickier if the cultivators had hired Larry’s to plant
“some plants” but did not disclose that they are cannabis cultivators, or even
used aliases to conceal the nature of their businesses.82 Then, the inquiry would
focus more on Larry’s knowledge in planting the plants. “[C]ourts ordinarily
read a phrase in a criminal statute that introduces the elements of a crime with
the word ‘knowingly’ as applying that word to each element.”83 In other words,
Larry’s would need to know that its employees are not only planting plants but
are also specifically planting cannabis and not, say, begonias.84 This knowledge
need not necessarily be positive knowledge. In the First Circuit, proof of either
actual knowledge or “willful blindness” can satisfy the knowledge element.85
Willful blindness occurs when
“(1) the defendant claims lack of knowledge; (2) the evidence would
support an inference that the defendant consciously engaged in a course of
deliberate ignorance; and (3) the proposed instruction, as a whole, could
not lead the jury to conclude that an inference of knowledge [is]
mandatory.” Evidence sufficient to meet requirement (2) can include

79

21 U.S.C § 841(a).
Id. § 802(15).
81
Id. § 802(22).
82
See In re Way to Grow, 597 B.R. at 129 (commenting that many of the debtor’s
marijuana-industry customers used aliases in lieu of their businesses’ real names when dealing
with the debtor).
83
Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 652 (2009).
84
See Hoover v. Wise, 91 U.S. 308, 310 (1876) (“The general doctrine, that the knowledge
of an agent is the knowledge of the principal, cannot be doubted.”); Sperry Rand Corp. v. Hill,
356 F.2d 181, 187 (1st Cir. 1966) (“What an agent learns within the scope of his authority is,
normally, imputed to the principal.”).
85
E.g., United States v. Pérez-Meléndez, 599 F.3d 31, 41 (1st Cir. 2010); United States v.
Griffin, 524 F.3d 71, 77 (1st Cir. 2008).
80

2021]

HITTING THE TRIP WIRE

1121

evidence that the defendant was confronted with “red flags” but
nevertheless said, “I don’t want to know what they mean.”86
If the circumstances put Larry’s on notice that it was being hired to plant
cannabis but Larry’s deliberately remained ignorant of the nature of the plants
being planted, that would be sufficient knowledge for its employees to have
knowingly planted cannabis plants, and thereby to have knowingly
manufactured marijuana. Although unlikely, it is theoretically possible to
imagine that no Larry’s employees and none of its agents knows that the plants
involved are cannabis plants or that the customers involved are cannabis
cultivators. In those unlikely circumstances, Larry’s could perhaps avoid
violating § 841(a)(1) and, thus, avoid being a Marijuana Business.
The analysis under § 846’s conspiracy theory would turn on similar facts. In
the First Circuit, proof of a conspiracy under § 846 requires proof of “the
existence of a conspiracy, the defendant’s knowledge of the conspiracy, and the
defendant’s voluntary participation in the conspiracy.”87 This further requires
proof of “an intent to agree and an intent to effectuate the commission of the
substantive offense.”88 The First Circuit also provides that willful blindness may
satisfy the knowledge of the conspiracy element, though it is insufficient to show
intent to join the conspiracy.89 The government may prove the agreement by
circumstantial evidence rather than express agreement.90
On this theory, it is not necessary to prove that Larry’s itself manufactured
marijuana—though that seems relatively easy to do under the CSA’s definition
of “manufacture” and related words. Instead, under the First Circuit’s conspiracy
test, the government would have to prove that Larry’s had the intent to enter into
an agreement with the cultivators to plant cannabis, knowledge that it was
planting cannabis, voluntary participation in the planting of cannabis, and intent
to effectuate the manufacture of cannabis. First, Larry’s was hired to plant
cannabis plants, meaning it affirmatively agreed with the cultivators that it
would plant plants. Next, Larry’s voluntarily participated in the planting of the
cannabis plants by doing the planting. What remains to be solved is whether
Larry’s had knowledge that it was planting cannabis and whether it intended to
effectuate the manufacture of cannabis.
These two elements are intertwined. Larry’s certainly intended to plant plants
and presumably intended to see them grow so that it would not face angry
customers seeking refunds or replacement plants. If Larry’s knew that it was
planting cannabis plants, its desire to see them grow would constitute intent to

86

United States v. Ford, 821 F.3d 63, 74 (1st Cir. 2016) (alteration in original) (citation
omitted) (quoting United States v. Gabriele, 63 F.3d 61, 66 (1st Cir. 1995)).
87
United States v. Gomez-Pabon, 911 F.2d 847, 852 (1st Cir. 1990).
88
United States v. Piper, 35 F.3d 611, 615 (1st Cir. 1994); see also United States v. U.S.
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 443 n.20 (1978) (“In a conspiracy, two different types of intent
are generally required—the basic intent to agree, which is necessary to establish the existence
of the conspiracy, and the more traditional intent to effectuate the object of the conspiracy.”).
89
See United States v. Lizardo, 445 F.3d 73, 85 (1st Cir. 2006).
90
Id. at 81.
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effectuate the commission of the substantive offense of manufacturing
cannabis.91 If, instead, Larry’s was hired by cultivators hiding behind aliases and
Larry’s was entirely unaware of the nature of the plants it was planting, it likely
can avoid the conspiracy charge. But, if the evidence (including circumstantial
evidence) proves that Larry’s was aware of a high probability that it was being
hired to plant cannabis but intentionally refrained from inquiring about the
nature of the plants, that could be deemed willful blindness toward the scheme
to manufacture cannabis. Because it seems likely that Larry’s knew or was
willfully blind regarding the fact that it was planting cannabis, the fact that
Larry’s planted the plants would constitute Larry’s voluntary participation in the
conspiracy with the requisite knowledge, thereby making Larry’s a Marijuana
Business.
Finally, Larry’s could be held liable on an aiding and abetting theory under
18 U.S.C. § 2. To prove aiding and abetting, the prosecution must show that the
defendant (1) took “an affirmative act in furtherance of [the] offense, (2) with
the intent of facilitating the offense’s commission.”92 The First Circuit considers
whether the defendant “associate[d] himself with the venture, that he
participate[d] in it as something he wish[ed] to bring about, that he [sought] by
his action to make it succeed.”93 The defendant must be shown to be “a
participant rather than merely a knowing spectator.”94 The defendant must have
“participated with advance knowledge of the elements that constitute the
charged offense.”95 This means the defendant must actually know, not just have
reason to believe, that the facts that make the defendant’s conduct meet the
elements of the offense, though this knowledge may come from willful
blindness.96 Moreover, the defendant’s knowledge may be proved through
circumstantial evidence.97
The facts indicate that cannabis cultivators hired Larry’s to plant cannabis
plants and that Larry’s planted those plants. The offense is manufacturing
cannabis. By planting the cannabis plants, Larry’s has taken an affirmative act
in furtherance of the offense of cannabis manufacture.

91

Here, the record shows beyond hope of contradiction that appellant, whether or not
he meant personally to participate in the distribution of the contraband, nonetheless
knowingly assisted in its asportation, with foreknowledge that the conspiracy
extended beyond the theft to the eventual disposal at some later date of the purloined
marijuana (totaling over 145 kilograms). He thus possessed the requisite mens rea.
Piper, 35 F.3d at 615.
92
United States v. Encarnación-Ruiz, 787 F.3d 581, 587 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting
Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65, 71 (2014)).
93
United States v. Martinez, 479 F.2d 824, 829 (1st Cir. 1973) (alterations in original)
(quoting United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938)).
94
Id. (quoting United States v. Garguilo, 310 F.2d 249, 254 (2d Cir. 1962)).
95
Encarnación-Ruiz, 787 F.3d at 588 (citing Rosemond, 572 U.S. at 68).
96
Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 607 n.3 (1994); United States v. Ford, 821 F.3d
63, 73-74 (1st Cir. 2016).
97
United States v. Fernández-Jorge, 894 F.3d 36, 47 (1st Cir. 2018).
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Next, the government must show that Larry’s had the intent to facilitate the
manufacture of cannabis. To this end, Larry’s has certainly associated itself with
the manufacturing venture—its contractual agreement with the cultivators to
plant their plants easily establishes this. The question remains whether Larry’s
participated in the growing of cannabis as something it wished to bring about
and sought by its action to make succeed. In all likelihood, Larry’s is indifferent
as to whether the cannabis cultivators run successful, profitable cannabis
cultivation operations. Larry’s does not stand to gain from the relationship with
the cannabis cultivators beyond the contractual amount paid to Larry’s to plant
plants. In this way, Larry’s resembles the fertilizer seller discussed below98—
happy to sell its services/product but not engaged in the venture beyond that.
This makes it seem as though there is insufficient evidence that Larry’s
relationship satisfies the elements for aiding and abetting liability, particularly
if the required mens rea is purpose, rather than mere knowledge.
But, there is a critical distinction here: Larry’s presumably wants the plants
to thrive, if only because it does not want to provide a replacement or a refund
for the failed plants.99 Unlike a fertilizer seller, Larry’s may retain some stake in
what happens after the contract has been performed. In planting the cannabis
plants, Larry’s is using its efforts to make the operations succeed, inasmuch as
it wants its planting efforts to succeed. Larry’s thus could be found to have the
requisite intent of active participation in the crime with full knowledge of the
circumstances100—assuming, of course, that Larry’s knows it is planting
cannabis and not begonias. If Larry’s does not actually know that it is planting
cannabis and is not willfully blind to that fact, then it likely does not have the
requisite mens rea and would not be liable for aiding and abetting the cannabis
growers’ manufacture of cannabis. But, for the reasons discussed in connection
with the conspiracy theory, Larry’s most likely does have that knowledge, which
means Larry’s is likely a Marijuana Business.
F.

Frida’s Fertilizers LLP
Frida’s Fertilizers LLP (“Frida’s”) sells organic fertilizer to commercial
farmers in Colorado. Frida’s sells to a broad base of customers but derives

98

See infra Section II.F.
Of course, the agreement between Larry’s and the cultivators could provide that Larry’s
would plant the plants and the risk of plant failure would lie with the cultivators. Though this
would minimize Larry’s association with the venture, the government could still argue that
Larry’s wants the plants to grow to maintain its reputation as a landscaping company. A
company known for planting duds and leaving its customers empty-handed is not likely to
remain in business. It is for this reason that companies selling plants tend to offer some degree
of guarantee. See, e.g., Return Policy, HOME DEPOT, https://www.homedepot.com/c
/Return_Policy [https://perma.cc/MAD4-CSQQ] (last visited Apr. 13, 2021) (offering a oneyear guarantee on shrubs, perennials, and trees); Store Services, LOWES,
https://www.lowes.com/l/store-services.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2021) (same).
100
See Rosemond, 572 U.S. at 76.
99

1124

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 101:1105

65% of its revenues from sales to cannabis cultivators. Frida’s is aware
that its customers are using the fertilizer to grow cannabis.
At first blush, Frida’s seems as though it could escape being a Marijuana
Business, and the complicity theories seem the most promising way to ensnare
it. In the Tenth Circuit, a conspiracy conviction requires that “(1) there was an
agreement to violate the law; (2) the defendant knew the essential objectives of
the conspiracy; (3) the defendant knowingly and voluntarily took part in the
conspiracy; and (4) the coconspirators were interdependent.”101 The agreement
may be inferred from the relevant facts and circumstances.102 Circumstantial
evidence may establish the defendant’s participation in the venture, “and the
level of participation may be of ‘relatively slight moment.’”103 The government
must prove that the conspirators shared a common purpose, though knowledge
can be inferred, and proof that the defendant “had ‘a general awareness of both
the scope and the objective’ of the conspiracy” can help establish knowing and
voluntary participation.104 Knowing participation can be inferred when the
defendant acts in furtherance of the conspiracy’s objectives.105 “Interdependence
is present when ‘each alleged coconspirator . . . depend[s] on the operation of
each link in the chain to achieve the common goal.’”106 The defendant’s actions
must facilitate either the other coconspirators’ objectives or the conspiracy as a
whole.107
The Tenth Circuit has recognized that the same evidence that supports a
conspiracy conviction under the CSA can also support an aiding and abetting
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2.108 Aiding and abetting liability attaches when a
person “‘(1) takes an affirmative act in furtherance of [the] offense, (2) with the
intent of facilitating the offense’s commission,’ i.e., ‘with full knowledge of the
circumstances constituting the charged offense.’”109 In the Tenth Circuit, “[a]
conviction for aiding and abetting can rest on a wide range of underlying
conduct, including ‘acts, words or gestures encouraging the commission of the

101
United States v. Isaac-Sigala, 448 F.3d 1206, 1210 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing United
States v. Riggins, 15 F.3d 992, 994 (10th Cir.1994)).
102
United States v. Evans, 970 F.2d 663, 669 (10th Cir. 1992).
103
Isaac-Sigala, 448 F.3d at 1210 (quoting United States v. Anderson, 189 F.3d 1201,
1207 (10th Cir. 1999)).
104
United States v. Carter, 130 F.3d 1432, 1440 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting Evans, 970 F.2d
at 670). But see Evans, 970 F.2d at 670 (“This is not to say, however, that a defendant may
be convicted of a conspiracy that defies common sense simply because he or she possesses a
general awareness of the breadth of its illegal activities.”).
105
Carter, 130 F.3d at 1440.
106
Evans, 970 F.2d at 670 (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Fox, 902 F.2d
1508, 1514 (10th Cir. 1990)).
107
Id.
108
See Isaac-Sigala, 448 F.3d at 1210.
109
United States v. Deiter, 890 F.3d 1203, 1214 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting Rosemond v.
United States, 572 U.S. 65, 71, 77 (2014)).
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offense, either before or at the time of the offense.’”110 “Even mere ‘words or
gestures of encouragement’ constitute affirmative acts capable of rendering one
liable under this theory.”111 While the actus reus element of aiding and abetting
presents a rather low bar, the mens rea element is a somewhat bigger hurdle: the
Tenth Circuit requires proof that the defendant both “shared in the ‘intent to
commit the underlying offense,’ [and also] ‘willfully associated with the
criminal venture.’”112 Thus, inadvertent assistance with a crime unknown to the
defendant will not result in aiding and abetting liability,113 though intent “may
be inferred from the surrounding circumstances.”114
In this case, Frida’s sells fertilizer, which is a product generally applicable to
a variety of crops. Though it is knowingly selling to cannabis growers, its sales
are not contingent upon or directly affected by the fact that the farmers are
growing cannabis, as opposed to a legal crop. Unlike the relationship between
Larry’s and the growers in the previous Section, Frida’s relationship with the
growers appears to end when the sale is concluded.
In an analogous situation, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado
declined to characterize a hydroponic gardening supply company as violating
the CSA on a conspiracy or aiding and abetting theory when the debtor’s
business served a variety of customers, including customers outside of the
marijuana industry; it intended to sell products to any hydroponic gardeners, not
only to cannabis growers; and the debtor’s products were applicable to any
hydroponically grown crops, not only to cannabis.115 Important to the court’s
analysis was the lack of specific intent necessary to violate the CSA.116 The court
found that the supply company had actual knowledge that it was selling to
marijuana customers and had reason to believe that its customers would use the
equipment to grow cannabis—essentially the situation that the Supreme Court
reserved in Rosemond.117 The company sold products that would be cost
prohibitive for growing anything other than cannabis, participated in marijuana
industry trade shows, and even marketed its expertise in supplying the marijuana
industry.118 Nonetheless, applying the Tenth Circuit’s aiding-and-abetting
jurisprudence, the court found that the supply company lacked the intent to
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Williams v. Trammell, 782 F.3d 1184, 1192 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting Wingfield v.
Massie, 122 F.3d 1329, 1332 (10th Cir. 1997)).
111
United States v. Bowen, 527 F.3d 1065, 1078 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States
v. Whitney, 229 F.3d 1296, 1303 (10th Cir. 2000)).
112
United States v. Rosalez, 711 F.3d 1194, 1205 (10th Cir. 2013).
113
United States v. Rufai, 732 F.3d 1175, 1190 (10th Cir. 2013).
114
Gomez v. Lind, No. 15-cv-02582, 2017 WL 6551147, at *9 (D. Colo. Oct. 16, 2017)
(citing Rosemond, 572 U.S. at 78 n.9).
115
In re Way to Grow, Inc., 597 B.R. 111, 126-27 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2018), aff’d, 610 B.R.
338 (D. Colo. 2019).
116
See id. at 126.
117
Id. at 129; see also Rosemond, 572 U.S. at 77 n.8 (reserving the question of incidental
aid to a crime, such as a knowing gun sale to a criminal).
118
In re Way to Grow, 597 B.R. at 129-31.
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violate the CSA and associate with the customers’ violations thereof.119 It further
declined to find that the debtor had conspired to violate the CSA, noting
insufficient evidence of an actual agreement between the debtor and the
purchasers of its equipment.120 For similar reasons, Frida’s is unlikely to be
found guilty on either a conspiracy or an aiding and abetting theory.
Unfortunately for Frida’s, though it likely escapes complicity liability, it has
potential direct liability under the CSA. Section 843(a)(6) makes it unlawful to
knowingly or intentionally “possess any . . . chemical, product, or material
which may be used to manufacture a controlled substance . . . knowing,
intending, or having reasonable cause to believe, that it will be used to
manufacture a controlled substance.”121 Further, § 843(a)(7) makes it unlawful
to knowingly or intentionally “distribute . . . any . . . chemical, product, or
material which may be used to manufacture a controlled substance . . . knowing,
intending, or having reasonable cause to believe, that it will be used to
manufacture a controlled substance. . . .”122 In the Tenth Circuit, to obtain a
conviction under § 843(a)(6) or (7), “[t]he government must prove the defendant
was aware, or had reasonable cause to believe, that the [chemical, product, or
material] would be used for the specific purpose of manufacturing” a controlled
substance.123 Neither negligence nor recklessness with respect to the risk that the
product being sold may be used to manufacture a controlled substance is
sufficient.124 Nor can the government obtain a conviction by proving that the
defendant knew, intended, or had reasonable cause to believe the product would
be put to some general illegal use; there must be knowledge as to the specific
use of manufacturing a controlled substance.125 Unlike the Eighth, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits, which consider both subjective and objective factors in
determining whether the mens rea element has been met in §§ 843(a)(6),
843(c)(7), and 841(c)(2) (which uses identical language), the Tenth Circuit
interprets the “reasonable cause to believe” language as “akin to actual
knowledge.”126 In other words, suspicions that a buyer’s intended use is illegal
or circumstances that would put a reasonable person on notice that something
119

Id. at 126.
Id.
121
21 U.S.C. § 843(a)(6).
122
Id. § 843(a)(7).
123
United States v. Truong, 425 F.3d 1282, 1289, 1291 (10th Cir. 2005).
124
Id. at 1289.
125
Id.
126
Id. (first quoting 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(c)(2), 843(6); and then quoting United States v.
Saffo, 227 F.3d 1260, 1269 (10th Cir. 2000)). For circuits that include both objective and
subjective considerations, see United States v. Kaur, 382 F.3d 1155, 1157-58 (9th Cir. 2004)
(finding that the “reasonable cause to believe” standard of § 841(c)(2) is both an objective
and subjective standard); United States v. Galvan, 407 F.3d 954, 957 (8th Cir. 2005) (rejecting
proffered jury instruction that required actual knowledge to convict under § 841(c)); and
United States v. Prather, 205 F.3d 1265, 1270 (11th Cir. 2000) (requiring either actual
knowledge or a reasonable cause to believe the chemical would be used to manufacture a
controlled substance).
120
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illicit was occurring are insufficient in the Tenth Circuit.127 A defendant has the
requisite knowledge only if the defendant actually knows or intends that the
chemical, product, or material the defendant possesses or distributes will be used
to manufacture a controlled substance.
Here again, Frida’s sells fertilizer to a number of customers, including
cannabis growers. Frida’s is aware that the customers are using the fertilizer to
grow cannabis. As discussed earlier, under §§ 802(15) and (22), “growing”
cannabis plants constitutes the “manufacture” of a controlled substance.128 Thus,
Frida’s has actual knowledge that customers are using the fertilizer to
manufacture a controlled substance.
Fertilizer is a “product” or “material” that may be used to grow (i.e.,
manufacture) cannabis. Frida’s possesses the fertilizer. Frida’s sells (i.e.,
“distributes”)129 the fertilizer to the cannabis growers. Frida’s both possesses and
distributes the fertilizer to the growers knowing that the growers will use it to
manufacture cannabis, which puts Frida’s in violation of §§ 843(a)(6) and (a)(7).
This makes Frida’s a Marijuana Business.
If the facts were different and Frida’s only suspected, but did not know, that
it was selling fertilizer to cannabis growers, Frida’s likely could escape liability
under the Tenth Circuit’s strict interpretation of the § 843 mens rea
requirements. The Tenth Circuit might decline to find the requisite intent even
if Frida’s could easily have gained that actual knowledge, though the Tenth
Circuit does, in rare cases, grant a deliberate ignorance instruction.130

127

See Truong, 425 F.3d at 1290.
See 21 U.S.C. § 802(15) (defining “manufacture” to include “production” of a drug);
id. § 802(22) (defining “production” to include the “growing[] or harvesting of a controlled
substance”); supra text accompanying notes 79-81.
129
Section 802(11) defines “distribute” as “deliver (other than by administering or
dispensing) a controlled substance.” 21 U.S.C. § 802(11). The statute defines “dispense” as
“to deliver a controlled substance to an ultimate user or research subject by, or pursuant to the
lawful order of, a practitioner, including the prescribing and administering of a controlled
substance.” Id. § 802(10). Frida’s is not delivering fertilizer to cannabis growers pursuant to
a practitioner’s lawful order, so it is distributing—not dispensing—the fertilizer.
130
See United States v. Concha, 233 F.3d 1249, 1252 (10th Cir. 2000). Truong makes clear
the extent to which this instruction is rarely granted. There, the defendant sold
pseudoephedrine multiple times from the gas station at which he worked in clandestine, afterhours sales. Truong, 425 F.3d at 1285. He told the police that he sold pseudoephedrine without
knowing what the pills would be used for and that he did not keep records of his sales. Id. The
sales were in cash, they were not rung into the cash register, and the product was sometimes
concealed within a Styrofoam cup with a lid and straw. Id. at 1286. Nonetheless, the Tenth
Circuit held that the evidence did not establish the specific mens rea necessary under § 843
because he did not have actual knowledge that the purchasers were planning to use the
pseudoephedrine to make methamphetamine. Id. at 1291. Though “[t]he huge quantity and
clandestine circumstances of the sales would surely have put any reasonable person on notice
that something nefarious was going on,” the court found the lack of specific knowledge of the
intended purpose to make methamphetamine to be dispositive. Id. at 1290-91. Notably, in
Truong, the government failed to challenge the district court’s denial of a request for a
“deliberate ignorance” jury instruction, so that was not considered on appeal. Id. at 1289 n.2.
128
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Unfortunately for Frida’s, these facts indicate that the company did know what
its fertilizer was being used for, which means it falls within the text of the statute.
Frida’s thus is a Marijuana Business.
G.

Jovial Janitors Inc.
Jovial Janitors Inc. (“Jovial”) provides commercial cleaning services for
a variety of retail establishments in New Jersey,131 including retail and
medical marijuana dispensaries. Jovial’s employees use roughly the same
equipment and supplies for all of its customers. It does not provide any
different or unusual services for its dispensary customers. Jovial does not
solicit dispensaries as customers or market itself as having particular
expertise cleaning marijuana-related businesses.

Jovial cleans the premises of businesses that are clearly violating § 841(a)(1)
of the CSA.132 Cleaning buildings is not conduct that directly violates the CSA,
so Jovial will be a Marijuana Business only if it can be convicted under a
complicity theory. To prove a drug distribution conspiracy under § 846 in the
Third Circuit, “the government must establish: (1) a shared unity of purpose
between the alleged conspirators, (2) an intent to achieve a common goal, and
(3) an agreement to work together toward that goal.”133 When a conspiracy
involves intent to distribute a controlled substance, the Third Circuit requires the
government “to introduce drug-related evidence, considered with the
surrounding circumstances, from which a rational trier of fact could logically
infer that the defendant knew a controlled substance was involved in the
transaction at issue.”134 It is not necessary to prove that the “defendant knew all
of the conspiracy’s details, goals, or other participants,”135 and either actual
knowledge or deliberate ignorance can suffice to demonstrate the requisite
knowledge.136 A conspiracy can be proved on the basis of circumstantial
131

New Jersey voters approved the legalization of retail marijuana in a legislatively
referred constitutional amendment on November 3, 2020. New Jersey Residents Vote to
Legalize Recreational Marijuana, CBS PHILLY (Nov. 4, 2020, 7:45 AM),
https://philadelphia.cbslocal.com/2020/11/04/new-jersey-residents-vote-to-legalizerecreational-marijuana/ [https://perma.cc/83EU-HTAF]. Retail sales of marijuana are not
expected in New Jersey until closer to the end of 2021, making this a somewhat fanciful
example. Kimberly Davis, Advocate Believes Recreational Marijuana Sales Won’t Begin in
New Jersey Until ‘Closer to Next Christmas,’ CBS PHILLY (Nov. 4, 2020, 10:31 PM),
https://philadelphia.cbslocal.com/2020/11/04/advocate-believes-recreational-marijuanasales-wont-begin-in-new-jersey-until-closer-to-next-christmas/.
132
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
133
United States v. Bailey, 840 F.3d 99, 108 (3d Cir. 2016).
134
United States v. Boria, 592 F.3d 476, 481 (3d Cir. 2010).
135
Bailey, 840 F.3d at 108 (quoting United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 343 (3d Cir.
2002)).
136
United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 425 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc); see
also United States v. Caminos, 770 F.2d 361, 365 (3d Cir. 1985) (“[A] ‘deliberate ignorance’
instruction must make clear that the defendant himself was subjectively aware of the high
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evidence and can be inferred “when evidence of related facts and circumstances
make clear that the defendants could not have carried out their activities ‘except
as the result of a preconceived scheme or common understanding.’”137
If Jovial were charged with a conspiracy to distribute marijuana in violation
of § 841(a)(1), the government would need to prove that Jovial shared a goal
with its dispensary customers to further the purpose of distributing marijuana
(unity of purpose),138 Jovial knew of the dispensaries’ goal of marijuana
distribution and intended to achieve that goal, and Jovial and the dispensaries
agreed to work together toward the goal of marijuana distribution. The
government would be unlikely to gather the requisite proof, even if it relied upon
circumstantial evidence.
Proving knowledge of the dispensaries’ distribution scheme would obviously
be the least burdensome element. Jovial’s staff is cleaning marijuana
dispensaries. Even if cleaning only occurs outside of business hours, it seems
highly likely that the nature of the dispensaries’ businesses would be obvious.
Unlike the type of clandestine drug deals that warrant judicial scrutiny as to the
degree and nature of the alleged conspirator’s knowledge,139 these marijuana
sales are occurring in businesses operating as marijuana sellers—in broad
daylight, as it were. If Jovial were part of a conspiracy to sell marijuana, it
appears relatively easy to prove that Jovial is aware that the conspiracy involved
marijuana sales.
Proof of charges against Jovial likely fail because it is probably not possible
to establish that Jovial shared a unity of purpose with the marijuana dispensaries
to sell marijuana and that it intended and agreed, whether tacitly or explicitly, to
work together toward that goal. Unlike conspirators who drive the car to the drug
sale,140 serve as lookout for the seller,141 or are paid to transport suitcases they
did not pack,142 Jovial is merely providing cleaning services. Perhaps it could be
argued that clean dispensaries are likely to sell more marijuana, but this is a
stretch, to put it mildly. Jovial does not solicit dispensary customers or provide
any unusual services for the dispensaries. There is no logical link between the
cleaning Jovial does and the marijuana sales from which it could be inferred that
Jovial shares the dispensaries’ goal of selling marijuana, intends to achieve the
goal of selling marijuana, or has agreed to work with the dispensaries toward
that goal. Without this proof of agreement, Jovial almost certainly cannot be
convicted of conspiracy under § 846.
probability of the fact in question, and not merely that a reasonable man would have been
aware of the probability.”).
137
Bailey, 840 F.3d at 108 (quoting United States v. Kapp, 781 F.2d 1008, 1010 (3d Cir.
1986)).
138
See United States v. Korey, 472 F.3d 89, 93 (3d Cir. 2007).
139
See, e.g., Boria, 592 F.3d at 481-82 (collecting cases in which the Third Circuit found
insufficient evidence for a jury to infer that drugs were involved).
140
See, e.g., United States v. Alston, 899 F.3d 135, 143-44 (2d Cir. 2018).
141
See, e.g., United States v. Carrasco-Deleon, 781 F. App’x 94, 95-96 (3d Cir. 2019).
142
See, e.g., United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 433-34 (3d Cir. 2013)
(en banc).
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The second possible complicity theory to examine is aiding and abetting. The
Third Circuit recognizes that, under Rosemond, convicting a defendant of aiding
and abetting a crime requires proof that the defendant (1) took “an affirmative
act in furtherance of [the] offense, (2) with the intent of facilitating the offense’s
commission.”143 Acting in furtherance of a crime requires “more than
associat[ion] with individuals involved in the criminal venture.”144 Neither mere
knowledge of the crime nor presence at the scene is sufficient for a conviction.145
Establishing the actus reus element requires proof that “the defendant associated
himself with the venture and sought by his actions to make it succeed,” including
“some affirmative participation which, at least, encourages the principal
offender to commit the offense.”146 Both words and actions can be the basis of
aiding and abetting culpability.147 To have the necessary mens rea, the defendant
must know of the substantive crime’s commission and act with specific intent to
facilitate it.148 Intent to commit a crime is found when the defendant “actively
participates in a criminal scheme knowing its extent and character.”149
Circumstantial evidence can be sufficient to support an aiding and abetting
conviction, provided that the connection between the facts and the conclusion is
“logical and convincing.”150
Applying these standards, it is unlikely that Jovial will be found guilty of
aiding and abetting a CSA violation. The government can easily prove the
substantive offense: the marijuana dispensaries are operating in violation of
§ 841(a)(1) by distributing a controlled substance. Likewise, the government can
probably prove Jovial’s knowledge of the dispensaries’ CSA violations; even
without direct evidence of knowledge, a reasonable juror could infer that
someone who cleans a store knows what the store sells.
Where the proof fails is in establishing that Jovial took an affirmative act to
further the marijuana sales and had the specific intent of facilitating those sales.
Under the Third Circuit’s jurisprudence, the government would have to prove
more than the facts that Jovial is associated with the dispensaries by contracting
to clean them, knows of the dispensaries’ marijuana sales, and even is present at
the dispensaries when the sales are taking place.151 Proof that Jovial
affirmatively participated in the marijuana sales, trying to make them succeed,
in some way that at least encouraged the dispensaries to sell marijuana is needed.

143
United States v. Whitted, 734 F. App’x 90, 93 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Rosemond v.
United States, 572 U.S. 65, 71 (2014)).
144
United States v. Dixon, 658 F.2d 181, 189 (3d Cir. 1981).
145
United States v. Mercado, 610 F.3d 841, 846 (3d Cir. 2010).
146
Id.
147
United States v. Centeno, 793 F.3d 378, 387 (3d Cir. 2015).
148
See id. at 387.
149
United States v. Colvard, No. 1:13-cr-00109, 2015 WL 5123893, at *10 (M.D. Pa. Sept.
1, 2015) (quoting Rosemond, 572 U.S. at 77).
150
Mercado, 610 F.3d at 846 (quoting United States v. Soto, 539 F.3d 191, 194 (3d Cir.
2008)).
151
See id.

2021]

HITTING THE TRIP WIRE

1131

In contrast with the prior examples, Jovial is not doing anything here that truly
furthers the marijuana sales. Jovial is not selling the marijuana itself.152 It is not
leasing the space from which the marijuana is sold.153 It is not providing funding
for the dispensaries154 or helping the dispensaries to acquire their product.155 It
is merely cleaning the buildings from which the marijuana is sold.
Again, perhaps customers are more likely to buy from a clean dispensary than
a dirty one, but this link seems too attenuated to convict Jovial of aiding and
abetting. It might be a different case if Jovial were receiving substantially all of
its revenue from cleaning marijuana-related businesses, if it marketed itself
specifically as a cleaner of dispensaries, if it had services or equipment specially
tailored to marijuana-related businesses, or if it employed dispensary-cleaning
specialists. In those circumstances, there would be a better argument that Jovial
is not a cleaning service but a marijuana-industry cleaning service. The greater
interrelation between Jovial’s work, the survival of its business, and the success
of its dispensary clients, the more plausible the argument that Jovial had the
requisite intent to assist the dispensaries in their goal of selling marijuana.
The facts do not indicate any of this. Other than the fact that Jovial would
prefer to have its customers remain in business (so they remain its customers),
Jovial is relatively indifferent as to whether the dispensaries succeed in selling
marijuana. It appears to offer generally applicable cleaning services that happen
to be deployed at marijuana dispensaries but that would be equally useful
elsewhere. Because Jovial lacks the specific intent to further the dispensaries’
marijuana sales, it is not aiding and abetting those sales. Thus, Jovial is not a
Marijuana Business.
III. EXTENSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
As the foregoing examples demonstrate, the CSA casts a wide net of potential
liability that may capture a number of seemingly innocent bystanders. It is easy
to think of other companies that run the risk of being Marijuana Businesses,156
such as the electricians that install grow lights, irrigation system companies that
install systems for cultivation facilities, or even interior designers hired to make
dispensaries look soothing and mellow. This discussion has purposefully
excluded banks, law firms, and medical practices because their potential
criminal liability is addressed elsewhere,157 though they too could certainly be
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See supra Sections II.A-B.
See supra Section II.C.
154
See supra Section II.D.
155
See supra Sections II.E-F.
156
Along this line, see generally Ryan Dadgari, Powering Mary Jane: Marijuana and
Electric Public Utilities 10 GOLDEN GATE U. ENV’T L.J. 55 (2018) for a discussion of whether
public utilities may face criminal liability for providing utility services to the marijuana
industry.
157
See generally, e.g., Hill, supra note 4; Kamin & Wald, supra note 4; Matt Lamkin,
Legitimate Medicine in the Age of Consumerism, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 385, 445 (2019);
153
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characterized as Marijuana Businesses. The Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Colorado captured the situation nicely in Malul: “The result in this case
emphasizes the need for professionals advising marijuana investors and
entrepreneurs to account for the full breadth of prohibited acts under the
CSA. . . . The law on these issues is not only in its infancy, but the results are
highly fact specific.”158 In other words, there is currently a lack of clear guidance
about exactly how close a company can get to the marijuana industry before it
is deemed a part of it.
What we know thus far is that the determination of when a company becomes
a Marijuana Business is highly fact intensive and fact specific. Companies that
obtain licenses to operate in the marijuana industry are the easiest cases; it is to
no one’s surprise that they are Marijuana Businesses. It is also relatively
simple—though not necessarily intuitive—to identify Marijuana Businesses
based on their direct violations of the CSA, whether as landlords, equipment
suppliers, or perhaps investors. The most difficult cases are companies that face
only potential indirect liability under the conspiracy or aiding and abetting
theories. They are difficult for two reasons: First, convicting these companies
under those theories is so fact-intensive that it makes it harder to predict liability
ex ante. And, second, these companies are engaging in conduct that is ostensibly
wholly legal under both state and federal law. A company that sells marijuanainfused maple syrup knows (or should know) that it is selling marijuana in
violation of the CSA. A company that sells organic fertilizer may not understand
that its fertilizer constitutes a product that can be used to manufacture marijuana
under circumstances that violate the CSA. And a janitorial services company
almost certainly would not expect that mopping floors could be analyzed as
potential evidence of a conspiracy to distribute marijuana. Although “ignorance
of the law is typically no defense to criminal prosecution,”159 it is not
unreasonable for companies to want some clear guidance about how close to the
marijuana industry fire they can get without getting burned.
With that in mind, courts, companies, and their advisors could consider a
number of factors in evaluating cases that are not directly addressed under the
CSA, including the following:
(1) Percentage of the company’s revenue derived from the marijuana
industry;160

Raymond J. Walsh, Jr., Note, Populations at Risk for Criminal Liability Under
Compassionate Use Acts, 25 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 275, 275-76 (1999).
158
In re Malul, 614 B.R. 699, 714 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2020).
159
McFadden v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2298, 2304 (2015).
160
See, e.g., In re Way to Grow, Inc., 597 B.R. 111, 132 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2018) (“Debtors’
business activities constituting violations of the CSA are a major part of Debtors’ ordinary
course of business. Whether marijuana-related customers account for 65% or 95% of Debtors’
revenue, eliminating all such revenue would be devastating to the Debtors.”), aff’d, 610 B.R.
338 (D. Colo. 2019); Alterman v. Comm’r, 115 T.C.M. (CCH) 1452, *1, *9 (2018)
(considering derivation of revenue as a factor in determining whether the taxpayer had
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(2) Extent to which the company solicits business from customers clearly
engaged in the marijuana industry;161
(3) Whether the company markets itself as being part of the marijuana
industry;162
(4) Degree to which the company offers products or services specialized
for the marijuana industry (as opposed to generally applicable products
or services);163
(5) Amount of capital the company invests in marijuana-related
activity;164
(6) Percentage of the company’s assets deployed in marijuana-related
activity;
(7) Amount of the company’s physical space dedicated to marijuanarelated activity;165
(8) Percentage of employee time engaged in marijuana-related activity;166
(9) Control, direct or indirect, of entities clearly engaged in the marijuana
industry.167

separate marijuana- and non-marijuana-related businesses for purposes of business-expense
deductions under I.R.C. § 280E).
161
See, e.g., In re Way to Grow, 597 B.R. at 130 (describing the debtor companies’
participation in marijuana-industry trade shows and their use of the shows to establish
relationships with prospective customers).
162
See, e.g., id. at 130-31 (discussing press releases and “investor decks” used by the
debtor companies to market themselves as suppliers for commercial cannabis growers).
163
See, e.g., id. at 126 (declining to find conspiracy liability where the debtors’ equipment
sales were applicable to crops other than cannabis).
164
See OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, NORTH AMERICAN
INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM 20 (2017), https://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics
/2017NAICS/2017_NAICS_Manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/5UJK-U3GN] (explaining that,
when a company engages in multiple activities, “[i]deally, the principal good or service should
be determined by its relative share of current production costs and capital investment at the
establishment.”).
165
See, e.g., Alt. Health Care Advocs. v. Comm’r, 151 T.C. 225, 239-40 (2018)
(considering the percentage of floor space dedicated to the taxpayer’s marijuana- and nonmarijuana-related activities to determine whether the taxpayer’s non-marijuana-related
activities constituted a separate trade or business for purposes of business-expense deductions
under I.R.C. § 280E); Californians Helping to Alleviate Med. Probs., Inc. v. Comm’r, 128
T.C. 173, 176 (2007) (noting the percentage of the taxpayer’s floor space dedicated to
marijuana activity).
166
See, e.g., Alt. Health Care Advocs., 151 T.C. at 239-40 (considering the percentage of
employee time dedicated to the taxpayer’s marijuana- and non-marijuana-related activities).
167
See, e.g., Burton v. Maney (In re Burton), 610 B.R. 633, 634, 641 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
2020) (affirming dismissal of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case where the debtors owned a
majority interest in a company engaged in the marijuana industry). But see In re Malul, 614
B.R. 699, 702, 711-12 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2020) (finding that debtor’s investment in a company
engaged in the marijuana industry was illegal notwithstanding the fact that the debtor had no
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These factors would best be used by courts alongside direct evidence of actual
knowledge and subjective intent as part of a totality-of-the-circumstances
examination. Likewise, companies could utilize these factors in structuring their
businesses and activities to avoid being Marijuana Businesses. Naturally, the
more facts indicating that a company courts the marijuana industry and the more
the company’s viability depends upon the success of marijuana-industry
customers, the more likely that company is to be a Marijuana Business.
This approach is imperfect because it does not clearly define the trip wire that
companies must avoid hitting if they do not wish to become Marijuana
Businesses. In this way, it is like a cardiologist’s advice to eat a healthy diet:
there is no telling exactly how much junk food can be eaten before the patient
will have a heart attack, but each cheeseburger and hot fudge sundae contributes
to the patient’s risk. Ultimately, the patient will have to decide which
indulgences are worth the coronary danger. Likewise, companies will have to
decide which entanglements with the marijuana industry are worth the risk of
becoming Marijuana Businesses.
Engaging in the modern marijuana industry couples this risk of criminal
liability with substantial profit potential, much like operating a bootlegging
operation during the Prohibition era.168 The difference is that bootleggers and
those who did business with them knew they were running unlawful businesses,
while modern marijuana industry actors and supporting players may believe they
are in the clear because their businesses are “legal” under state law. All
indications suggest that the federal government is unlikely to take action against
Marijuana Businesses operating in compliance with state laws,169 but there is no
guarantee that prosecutorial priorities will not change. Until then, those who
choose to enter the marijuana industry, directly or indirectly, risk a visit from
the fuzz and a trip to the big house.170

voting rights in, or other indicia of control over, the company).
168
See A Bootlegger’s Story, supra note 1 (describing the profitability of the illegal liquor
business during Prohibition).
169
See Newell, High Crimes, supra note 4, at 105-09 (describing the federal government’s
evolving guidance on federal enforcement of the CSA against the state-legalized marijuana
industry).
170
SMOKY HILL MUSEUM, 1920S SLANG, https://www.smokyhillmuseum.org/file
_download/inline/bdbddbb8-d584-42c5-bd7b-bb8b88c9870f
[https://perma.cc/95JUAWDW] (last visited Apr.13, 2021).

